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ABSTRACT 
 
Small-scale corruption in government administrations that govern natural resources is believed to 
have a negative impact on conservation management. Yet, while corruption is said to obstruct the 
implementation of conservation policies, for instance as bribery may enable poaching in protected 
reserves, it is an underexplored area of research. This study investigates the effect of corruption, 
others’ compliance behavior, and support for regulations on rule-violating intentions. In a between-
subjects experiment, a sample of resource users active in South African small-scale fisheries (N = 
201) answered questions about rule-violating intentions after reading one of four scenarios, each 
depicting a different situation of corruption among officials that enforce regulations and compli-
ance behavior of other resource users. The results show that resource users are more likely to state 
rule-violating intentions when corruption among inspectors is widespread. Moreover, there is an 
interaction effect with support for conservation regulations, suggesting that the effect of corruption 
is stronger among individuals who do not support such rules. These findings lend further support 
for the proposition that to improve the effectiveness of conservation policy, more effort is needed 
to reduce bribery among government officials, such as rangers and inspectors that enforce natural 
resource regulations. 
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Introduction 
A necessary condition for sustainable management of natural resources is not only that there are 
some institutionalized rules of usage and access, but also that these rules are adhered to by users 
(Ostrom 1999). Current research therefore holds that noncompliance to regulations, such as poach-
ing, constitutes a severe obstacle for efficient conservation (Dietz et al. 2003). If efficiently man-
aged, protected areas may be a successful conservation strategy (Nolte et al. 2013). However, the 
problem facing many protected reserves (terrestrial as well as marine) is that their supervision is far 
from ideal. There is a general suspicion that reserves in low-income countries are often only “paper 
parks”, protected only on paper (see Edgar et al. 2014; Halpern 2014). Especially, the role of cor-
ruption—the misuse of public power for private gain in government authorities—has been said to 
be a factor contributing to the weak management of such conservation efforts (e.g., Robbins 2000). 
However, more research is needed on the relationship between corruption in authorities enforcing 
conservation regulations and the extent to which these rules are adhered to. Smith and colleagues 
(2015) recently noted that current research on natural resource management may need to shift its 
focus: “The impact of corruption on conservation outcomes is often ignored” (p. 953). 
Research suggests that perceptions of corruption among citizens negatively affect their 
intent to follow rules (Levi et al. 2009; Sundström 2012). Yet, there are some knowledge gaps with 
regards to this process. Since such perceptions may in fact be a cue for opinions of how other peo-
ple follow or violate rules (Tyran and Feld 2006), this effect may be a proxy for the tendency to 
avoid free-riding rather than a direct effect in itself. Thus, it is not clear if there is an independent 
effect from corruption perceptions on rule-violating intentions. Moreover, studies have not investi-
gated if the effect from corruption is stronger among certain individuals. Specifically, since the liter-
ature suggests that attitudes to the regulations that govern a certain resource are one important 
factor that determines intentions to follow or break rules (e.g., Jagers et al. 2012), it is reasonable to 
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assume that users who are less supportive of regulations are also more affected by corruption per-
ceptions.   
The purpose of this article is, first, to examine if there is a direct effect from corruption 
on rule-violating intentions, independent of others’ compliance behavior and, secondly, to investi-
gate if this effect is moderated by an individual’s support for regulations. To meet this aim, this 
study empirically explores the effect of corruption, others’ compliance behavior and support for 
regulations on rule-violating intentions. In a between-subjects experiment, a sample of resource 
users active in South African small-scale fisheries (N = 201) answered questions about intentions to 
violate rules after reading one of four scenarios, each depicting a different situation of corruption 
among public inspectors and compliance behavior of other resource users. 
This article proceeds as follows: The next section deals with theory and previous empiri-
cal findings. Section three describes methods and data. The fourth section then reports the results. 
The final section concludes by discussing these findings in relation to the existing literature and 
suggests avenues for future research. 
 
Corruption and rule violations:  Theoretical expectations and empir-
ical findings 
 
This article focuses on small-scale corruption, sometimes termed bureaucratic or petty corruption. 
In a context of natural resource management, such actions may occur when a resource user gives a 
bribe to an enforcement agent in order to violate existing conservation rules without sanctions. 
Rule violations are here used interchangeably with the term noncompliance. As stated by Arias 
(2015), compliance to conservation rules is a concept that may be viewed as a dichotomy, yet in 
practice the term refers to “the degree of adherence to rules, as when a person breaks some rules 
but not all, or respect most of the rules but not always” (p. 134). Following the literature, an as-
sumption is that violations of formalized conservation rules are important to study because re-
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sources are more likely to be managed sustainably if a majority of resource users abide by usage and 
access regulations (Platteau 2008). 
Research identifies that corruption affects outcomes in natural resource management and 
conservation in two direct as well as two indirect ways: First, it may influence policymakers to re-
frain from enacting stricter legislation, for instance, to regulate pollution or the harvesting of a cer-
tain resource (Fredriksson et al. 2004). Second, it could decrease the effectiveness of existing legis-
lation during their phase of implementation, as bribery may hamper law enforcement (Smith and 
Walpole 2007). The first indirect (and positive) effect pertains to the suppressing effect from cor-
ruption on economic development that, in turn, may create an overall lower pressure on environ-
mental resources in a society (Damania et al. 2003). The second indirect effect is the possibility of 
political business cycles in which decision-makers, seeking political support, may send signals to 
bureaucratic actors to let rule violations go unsanctioned during electoral times (Min and Golden 
2014).  
Numerous empirical studies have focused on the aggregate relationship between national 
levels of corruption and different indicators of natural resource management and environmental 
goods—generally showing that corruption negatively affects ecological outcomes but also present-
ing some conflicting patterns that mainly relate to how sustainability is measured (see Halkos et al. 
(2015) for a recent overview of the empirical findings in this cross-sectional literature). Notably, 
Barrett and colleagues (2006) highlight that these studies are generally limited by the fact that they 
hardly can capture the complexity of this relationship using nation-level indicators. Contrasting to 
that macro-oriented literature, the present study examines this relationship on the micro-level and 
does so by specifically focusing on the impact from corruption on the abidance to conservations 
rules during their implementation.  
A handful of studies illustrate empirically how the impact from corruption on conserva-
tion management may take shape within different localities in regions as disparate as Africa, Asia, 
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and Latin America; collusion with agents in forestry departments enable certain resource users to 
benefit from logging activities while others are excluded from such practices (Robbins 2000; Miller 
2011); bribes to customs officers to circumvent trade bans on endangered species and thus enable 
smuggling of animals and plants across national borders (Smith et al. 2003; Wyatt 2013); illegal 
payments to government fisheries inspectors enable fishermen from distant coastal localities to 
encroach on resource regimes they are not allowed to access and to overharvest such local marine 
resources (Young 2001); the hiring of “ghost employees” to protect terrestrial reserves and pocket 
this money instead of employing actual rangers (Cavanaugh 2012); the lax enforcement of conser-
vation rules by such government inspectors (Smith and Walpole 2007); the providing of loggers 
with “legal” contracts (Gore et al. 2013); and the actual involvement of corrupt public inspectors in 
poaching activities (Sundström 2015). Such actions obviously have severe consequences for natural 
resource management on the aggregate. Yet, there are knowledge gaps in this body of research. 
Importantly, it was recently noted that “the connections between corruption and conservation re-
main an under-researched aspect of conservation scholarship” (Hanson and McNair 2014, p. 313). 
With the specific focus on the relationship between small-scale corruption and violations 
of rules, this study follows the tradition of a large literature that studies the factors contributing to 
why people obey the law (Levi 1997; Tyler 2006). Writings on compliance often stress factors of 
rationality—that rule obedience is a calculus of the expected gain from breaking such rules in rela-
tion to the costs and probability of getting caught and facing sanctions (e.g., Becker 1968). Accord-
ing to this view “an individual commits a crime if the expected utility from committing the crime 
exceeds the utility from engaging in legitimate activity” (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, pp. 310–311). 
Other veins of research on compliance stress that abidance to rules is a matter of factors related to 
morality, trust towards other agents, and the expectations of how other people act (see Scholz 1998; 
Murphy 2004; Hatcher and Gordon 2005).    
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Researchers focusing on such features of trust heuristics and the expectation of other 
agents see compliance intentions affected by expectations about both horizontal and vertical rela-
tionships: The horizontal aspect denotes the relationship between citizens, and the vertical aspect 
conveys the relationship between citizens and agents in state authorities (see Sjöstedt 2014). Re-
garding the relationship between citizens, a common understanding founded in research on reci-
procity is that people evaluate others’ behavior in their assessment on whether or not to comply 
with rules (Torgler 2007). Here, perceptions of freeriding are crucial, as most people likely do not 
want to be the only “sucker” in the group following (costly) rules (Tyran and Feld 2006, p. 137). In 
line with this reasoning,. Similarly, another widely held understanding in the literature is that, per-
taining to the vertical relationship between citizens and government agents, trust and trustworthi-
ness matter: “The more trustworthy citizens perceive governments to be, the more likely they are to 
comply with or even consent to its demands and regulations” (Levi and Stoker 2000, p. 491). Here, 
the role of corruption comes into play, since bribery is believed to have a negative impact on such 
perceptions (Rothstein 2011). Researchers therefore suggest that compliance intentions are shaped 
by perceptions of corruption in state authorities (Levi et al. 2009). These authors conclude that 
“corruption undermines citizens’ willingness to comply with the law” (p. 359). The suggested nega-
tive impact from corruption on rule abidance is also supported by studies taking a more rationalist 
view on human behavior: Such scholars identify that corruption will lower citizens’ tendencies to 
follow rules, since the bribe will often be less costly than facing sanctions from noncompliance, 
such as fines: “Bribery dilutes deterrence because it results in a lower payment by an offender than 
the sanction for the offense” (Polinsky and Shavell 2000, p. 2). One of the few studies that has 
examined this question empirically confirms that corruption perceptions have a negative impact on 
compliance intentions (Sundström 2012). 
To summarize, the literature seems to lend support for the reasoning that corruption has 
an undesirable effect on a citizen’s willingness to follow rules. Yet, there are some notable gaps in 
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our knowledge: In this literature it is not clear how the two factors—the possibly corrupt behavior 
of inspectors and the possibly rule–violating behavior of other people—relate to each other when 
individuals make decisions over whether to violate rules. For instance, it is possible that perceptions 
of corruption are in fact only a proxy for a perception of others’ compliance behavior since wide-
spread bribery could mean that other people cheat the rules on a general basis. Previous studies 
have not examined if there is an independent effect from corruption among public inspectors if 
one takes into account the rule-violating actions of other resource users. I therefore pose the fol-
lowing hypothesis: 
 
H1: Corruption among public inspectors has a direct encouraging effect on rule-violating intentions, also 
taking into account whether or not other resource users follow the rules. 
 
Moreover, research is in need of disentangling this relationship. Here I draw on writings that sug-
gest that compliance behavior among resource users is determined by whether or not one believes 
that the existing rules are legitimate and founded on notions of fairness (see Jentoft 2000; Gezelius 
2004). With regards to marine natural resource regulations, studies have also shown that an im-
portant factor for support of regulations is the extent to which they are perceived as being founded 
on a scientifically accurate assessment of fish stocks (Jagers et al. 2012). These authors state that 
“regulatory measures must be meaningful to fishers, and they must be experienced as fair ... Legiti-
macy also sits in the eyes of the fishers, the ones who have to live with regulations and who, at the 
end of the day, can determine and control how effective they actually are” (p. 975). Given the sup-
posed importance of support for regulations, it is likely that the negative effect from corruption on 
willingness to follow regulations will not affect all individuals in the same way but rather be moder-
ated by support for existing regulations. This reasoning lends me to pose the following hypothesis: 
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 H2: The effect of corruption among public inspectors on rule-violating intentions is moderated by a re-
source user’s support for existing regulations and therefore the effect of corruption is stronger among individuals with a 
lower support for the rules.   
 
The purpose of this article is to examine these theoretical predictions empirically. The 
next section describes the context in which this study is performed and outlines the details of this 
investigation. 
 
Methods and data 
Context 
The study focuses on the case of marine fisheries regulations in South Africa as a context where 
participants can relate to the presence of corruption as well as the costs of abiding by regulations 
that limit their potential income. The formal regulations governing these fisheries, contained in the 
South African Marine Living Resources Act, outline which actions are illegal, such as fishing in 
protected reserves or using certain equipment (Republic of South Africa 1998). The responsible 
authority for enforcing such regulations is the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 
This authority employs public inspectors to monitor the compliance behavior of actors in the 
small-scale fisheries sector through land-based operations.  
This sector has a history of both bribery and rule violations among its actors. Fishermen 
are known to pay bribes (monetary and nonmonetary) to inspectors from this authority to avoid 
sanctions for noncompliance (see Hauck and Kroese 2006; Hauck 2008; Hauck and Fernández-
Gallardo 2013; Sundström 2013).1 Moreover, support for the regulations is perceived as low among 
                                                     
1 For a discussion on how the marine regulations and their implementation in South Africa differ from neighboring states 
in the region, see Sjöstedt and Sundström 2013; Sjöstedt and Sundström 2014. 
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fishermen, and rule violations in this sector are widespread (e.g., Raemaekers and Britz 2009; 
Pramod 2011). 
 
Participants, design, and material 
The sample consisted of 201 small-scale fishermen that were approached on landing sites and har-
bors along the south and west coasts of South Africa by a survey team trained by the author during 
May and June 2014. These individuals were most often sampled when preparing their nets or 
equipment before entering the water, as to ensure that they had sufficient time to complete the 
questionnaire. They were promised anonymity and participation was voluntary with no paid com-
pensation. After the survey was completed all participants were debriefed. For a description of the 
sample characteristics, see Appendix 1.  
An experimental design gauged the impact from corruption on compliance perceptions. 
Since this approach permits the isolation of certain factors, the experimental approach has benefits 
that are absent in an observational study. As pinpointed by Ostrom, “experiments thus allow one to 
test precisely whether individuals behave within a variety of institutional settings as predicted by 
theory” (1998, p. 5). With the terminology outlined by Harrison and List (2004), the design utilized 
the strength of having a nonstandard subject pool. In situating this attempt in the broader literature, 
the study therefore joins prior attempts to include resource users as experimental participants (see 
Cardenas and Ostrom 2004; Cardenas and Carpenter 2008; Gelcich et al. 2013). The advantage with 
such an approach is that the external validity is potentially higher than if a similar study is conduct-
ed with a standard subject pool, for example, college students in a university laboratory.    
Each participant filled out a questionnaire indicating socioeconomic characteristics and 
attitudes to regulations of the fisheries sector. An index measuring support for regulations was 
created from five items: if violations risk the reputation of fishermen, if regulations promote sus-
tainability, if rules are founded on correct stock estimates, if regulations are fair and just, and if 
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breaking rules is considered a disloyal action toward fellow fishermen (Cronbach’s alpha = .93), 
measured on a 1–7 rating scale (ranging from “strongly agree” to “disagree strongly”).  
The experiment had a 2 (Corruption description: inspectors often take bribes to be blind 
to rule violations vs. seldom take bribes) X 2 (Compliance description: other people often violate 
rules vs. seldom violate rules) between-subjects design. The dependent variable was rule-violating 
intentions. The participants were randomly assigned one of four questionnaires, outlining one sce-
nario in which the two factors were manipulated. The first scenario stated, “Imagine the following 
situation: If you are caught for violating fisheries regulations there is a high probability that you can 
pay an inspector a gift or a small amount of money in order for any criminal charges or fines to 
disappear. Also, you should consider that among your fellow fishermen it is very common that they 
are noncompliant.” In the second scenario, a similar text was posed, yet described a situation where 
there is a high probability that inspectors may take bribes to let violations go unnoticed, but other 
fishermen are described as rarely violating rules. The third scenario described that there is a low 
probability that inspectors may take bribes to let violations go unnoticed and other fishermen as 
often violating rules. Finally, in the fourth scenario there was a low probability that inspectors take 
bribes to let violations go unnoticed and other fishermen are described as rarely violating rules. For 
a visualization of the four different versions of the questionnaire, see Figure 1. A number of con-
trols were performed to test if these groups differ in terms of socioeconomic characteristics. Ap-
pendix 2 shows that there are no significant differences in the distribution of a number of observa-
ble factors over the treated groups, thus indicating that the treatments were given at random. 
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FIGURE 1, FOUR VERSIONS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE: A VISUALIZATION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL 
DESIGN  
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Group 1 
 
Corruption is common 
Rule violations are common 
 
 
Group 3 
 
Corruption is uncommon 
Rule violations are common 
 
Group 2 
 
Corruption is common 
Rule violations are uncommon 
 
Group 4 
 
Corruption is uncommon 
Rule violations are uncommon 
 
After reading the scenario, the participants answered questions that assessed their rule-violating 
intentions. An aggregate index was created using three items regarding rule-violating intentions, 
measured on a 1–7 rating scale: How willing one is, in general, to follow the regulations of this 
sector (ranging from “very willing” to “not at all willing”), how many times in the coming month 
one would follow regulations (ranging from “on all of the occasions” to “on none of the occa-
sions”), and to what extent would one consider violations of rules in this sector (ranging from “do 
not consider violations at all” to “consider violations very frequently”). The components of this 
index correlate highly (Cronbach’s alpha = .82). 
The ensuing analysis also includes a number of control variables that earlier studies pin-
pointed as important. First, it is reasonable to assume that fishermen that have been active for a 
long time in this sector may differ from fishermen that recently got access to this resource, as such 
actors may not be as dependent on this income (Eggert and Lokina 2010). A variable measuring the 
years of fishing experience (ranging from zero and up) was therefore created. Another variable that may 
be of interest is the income of a fisherman, since this may be crucial for understanding the extent to 
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which an individual needs revenue. Here, the relative standing of individuals in the community was 
thought to especially matter (Velez et al. 2012). An item gauging income relative to other fishermen was 
created from the question, “What statement best describes your income level in relation to other 
fishers in your community” (five response categories range from “lower than most fishers” to “bet-
ter off than most fishers”). It is analyzed as a dummy variable with “lower than most fishers” serv-
ing as the reference category. Finally, an individual’s prosocial or altruist value orientation has been 
pinpointed in research to predict cooperative behavior in terms of resource usage, for instance, if 
an individual tends to abide to rules (Ostrom et al. 1999).  To gauge the concept of altruist tenden-
cies within the range of social value orientation—defined as “one’s stable preferences for distribu-
tions of important resources between others and oneself” (Van Lange 1999, p. 337)—the survey 
utilized a method developed and established in the field of psychology (for a review, see Rusbult 
and Van Lange 2003). The procedure included a set of choices following one introductory ques-
tion. The aim of these items is to divide respondents (based on their responses) into one of three 
categories: Altruist (or Prosocial), Egoist, or Competitor. The participant chose among three hypo-
thetical self-other distribution options. Nine versions of such choices outline if the individual pre-
ferred a situation where “you” get x of a resource whereas “other” gets y, which may be smaller or 
equal to x. The altruist response is the one where the participant maximized the combined payoff 
for other and self. Following this literature, “altruist social orientation” is the dichotomous coding 
for individuals (denoted by 1 in the data) who chose six or more prosocial outcomes in these nine 
distributive scenarios (see Van Lange 1999; Fetzer Institute 2014). 
 
Results 
Across the four different groups, the participants that received the corruption stimuli (groups 1 and 
2) have a considerably higher mean value of rule-violating intentions than participants that did not 
receive this treatment. Table 1 shows numerically how the mean values in such intentions differ 
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across the four groups, and Figure 2 illustrates these patterns through boxplots. Group 1, the par-
ticipants that received both the corruption stimuli and the compliance stimuli, has the overall larg-
est average mean value of rule-violating intentions. However, the impact of the compliance stimuli 
is apparently moderate to nonexistent since Groups 3 and Group 4 almost has the same mean val-
ues in this regard. To examine if there is an interaction between the two factors of corruption and 
compliance we turn to a framework of a two-way ANOVA. 
 
TABLE 1, THE AVERAGE WILLINGNESS TO VIOLATE RULES AMONG THE DIFFERENT GROUPS 
  
Group 1 
 
Inspectors are corrupt, 
other fishermen often 
violate rules 
 
 
Group 2 
 
Inspectors are corrupt, 
other fishermen seldom 
violate rules 
 
 
Group 3 
 
Inspectors are not corrupt, 
other fishermen often 
violate rules 
 
 
Group 4 
 
Inspectors are not corrupt, 
other fishermen seldom 
violate rules 
Mean 3.43 3.32 2.31 2.29 
SD 1.44 1.35 0.79 0.60 
 Comment: The variable “rule-violating intentions” is an aggregate index that runs from 1 (low intentions to violate rules) to 7 
(high intentions to violate rules). 
 
FIGURE 2, RULE-VIOLATING INTENTIONS IN THE FOUR DIFFERENT GROUPS 
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We proceed to run a two-way ANOVA on the sample of 201 participants to investigate the effect 
of perceived government corruption and other citizens’ compliance on rule-violating intentions. 
There are simple main effects from the corruption stimuli, F(1, 197) = 47.83, p = .000, η2 = .20. 
However, there is no significant interaction between the effects of the two treatments on rule-
violating intentions, F(1, 197) = 0.16, p = .686. Moreover, there are no differences in main effects 
from the compliance stimuli (p = .746). We then examine if there are interactions between the cor-
ruption stimuli and support for regulations by using an OLS regression framework.  
As can be seen in Table 2, the first model using OLS regression confirms the trends 
of the two-way ANOVA: The corruption treatment has an independent effect that is statistically 
significant (p = .000). The size of the coefficient implies that rule-violating intentions are roughly 
one point greater among participants that received the corruption treatment than those that re-
ceived the no corruption scenario. When the index of rule support is introduced in the second 
model the measure of corruption is still significant, albeit with a smaller coefficient. The variable 
rule support in Model 2 is significant and implies that a one-point increase on this scale, that is, to-
ward less support of regulations, would render an average effect of an almost 0.5 point increase on 
the scale of rule-violating intentions. Model 3 includes an interaction term between rule support 
and the corruption stimuli, which is statistically significant. When this variable is included, the ex-
planatory power of the model, expressed by the adjusted R-squared, increases (comparing the R-
squareds in Models 2 and 3)—implying that the model with an interaction term explains a larger 
share of the variation among an individual’s rule-violating intentions. 
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TABLE 2, THE DETERMINANTS OF RULE-VIOLATING INTENTIONS. OLS REGRESSION (B-VALUES) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Corruption treatment 1.08* 
(0.16) 
0.58* 
(0.14) 
-0.59 
(0.36) 
-0.69 
(0.36) 
Compliance treatment  0.05 
(0.16) 
0.16 
(0.12) 
0.14 
(0.12) 
0.08 
(0.12) 
Rule support (index)  0.48* 
(0.05) 
0.14 
(0.11) 
0.07 
(0.10) 
Corruption*Rule support     0.42* 
(0.12) 
0.45* 
(0.12) 
Altruist social orientation    Yes 
Years of fishing experience    Yes 
Income relative to other fishermen    Yes 
Constant 2.28* 
(0.13) 
0.98* 
(0.17) 
 
1.88* 
(0.33) 
 
2.41* 
(0.34) 
 
N 201 201 201 201 
Adj. R-squared  .20 .46 .50 .55 
Comment: * p < .001. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. None of the variables included as controls (indicated as a 
“yes”) are significant. The variable of relative income is a set of four dummy variables with one excluded category as the reference. 
 
The interaction effect between corruption and rule support remains statistically significant also in 
the fourth model, when socioeconomic and attitudinal control variables are included. Thus, the 
interaction term illustrates how the effect of the corruption stimuli changes, dependent on a one-
step increase in the variable rule support. Its positive direction indicates that the less an individual 
tends to support rules, the stronger the effect is from the corruption variable. In the fourth model 
the interaction effect has the coefficient of 0.45. In this model the coefficient from corruption, -
0.69, should be interpreted as being the effect when rule support is set as zero and it is predicted to 
increase by 0.45 for each increase of one point in rule support. To further interpret the coefficient 
from this interaction term we analyze the conditional marginal effects. These effects, illustrated in 
Figure 3, show at what levels of rule support this impact is significant. The figure predicts the effect 
of corruption at different values of rule support and the related confidence intervals. This effect is 
significant at the 95% level for values of rule support over about 2.5. Hence, the impact of the cor-
ruption treatment is the strongest among individuals with the lowest support for rules.  
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FIGURE 3, MARGINAL EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION AND RULE SUPPORT, BASED ON MODEL 5 IN 
TABLE 2 
 
 
 
It should be noted we made sure to investigate if there is multicollinearity in the model above. Col-
linearity diagnostics indicate that the variables are not problematic in terms of tolerance and that 
Variance Inflation Factors are within secure boundaries. Moreover, we also found that the full 
model is robust for a number of alternative specifications, for instance, if one let another category 
of social value orientation (i.e., egoist or competitive tendencies) be denoted as 1 and the others as 
0. Moreover, several models were explored that included interaction terms between the compliance 
treatment and the corruption treatment, an interaction term with rule support and compliance and, 
finally, a three-way interaction effect between these two treatments and rule support. Importantly, 
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in none of these models is the compliance treatment, or interaction terms that include this variable, 
significant. Thus, contrary to expectations in the literature, no effect from other resource users’ 
compliance behavior was found in the analysis. One possibility is that the theoretical predictions in 
this regard simply do not have empirical support in this context. Another possible explanation for 
this rather surprising finding may be that the problem lies in how this concept was operationalized 
and measured: It is possible that the scenario should perhaps have been designed to induce strong-
er perceptions of rule violations among other resource users. Further research would benefit from 
fine-tuning such scenarios and treatment variables and from empirically examining if the results 
here hold when measured in a slightly different way.   
Some further limitations of this study deserve mentioning. This investigation was per-
formed in one context with specific features. It is possible that if the same study were carried out in 
another locality, perhaps with resource users active in a different type of harvesting, the results may 
differ. As often is the case with experimental studies, the results from this research should be fur-
ther examined, possibly through the replication of this design in other contexts.  
 
Conclusions 
Media reports anecdotally mention corruption as being one of the key problems for management in 
conservation efforts of protecting key species and areas (e.g., New York Times 2013). To illustrate, 
bribery among rangers is believed to facilitate the poaching of endangered mammals (The Guardian 
2013). Yet, this issue is still underexplored empirically by systematic research, and several authors 
have called for a more extensive focus on corruption in the conservation scholarship (Agrawal 
2007; Hanson and McNair 2014; Smith et al. 2015).   
This study’s empirical findings illustrate the independent effect from corruption on rule-
violating intentions among resource users active in the South African small-scale fisheries. With an 
experimentally designed survey—that can isolate the causal impact from certain variables in a way 
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that observational studies cannot—these results suggest that resource users are more likely to vio-
late rules when corruption is widespread. Moreover, the study provides further theoretical insights 
into the process in which corruption perceptions deter the willingness to follow rules. That is, an 
interaction effect with support for regulations lends backing for the intuitive reasoning that there 
are differences between resource users in this regard: The effect from corruption on rule-violating 
intentions is stronger among individuals who are less supportive of regulations.  
Future research would benefit from performing similar experimental studies in other set-
tings and with different participants. As discussed, these studies may specifically gain from explor-
ing different survey items that tap into compliance intentions to see if this may fine-tune such find-
ings. Moreover, larger surveys that target resource users that ask specific as well as open-ended 
questions about corruption and rule-violating behavior would enable researchers to get a better 
understanding of this pertinent relationship.   
The implications from this study lend further support to the suggestion that to improve 
the effectiveness of conservation practices, through increased rule compliance, more effort is need-
ed to reduce bribery among government officials. Thus, this implies that the conservation commu-
nity would benefit from further engagement in efforts to induce anti-corruption programs. One 
such notable example is, for instance, Transparency International’s Forest Governance Integrity 
Program that targets corruption and illegal logging in the forestry sector (Transparency Internation-
al 2011). This work may be used as a case to analyze further and apply to other conservation sec-
tors. 
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Appendix 1: Sample characteristics: Socioeconomic features of 
participants, percentage (N) 
 
Age  Under 18 year 
5.5 (11) 
18–24 years 
13.9 (28) 
25–50 years 
54.7 (110) 
Over 50 years 
25.9 (52) 
Sex  Male 
77.6 (156) 
Female 
22.4 (45) 
  
Religion  Christian 
52.2 (105) 
Muslim 
44.3 (89) 
Other 
3 (6) 
None 
0.5 (1) 
Marital status  Single 
33.8 (68) 
Married 
54.2 (109) 
Divorced/Widowed 
12 (24) 
 
 
Fishing income  Subsistence for some 
months 
 
10 (20) 
  
Subsistence for more than 
six months  
 
33 (66) 
Subsistence for the whole 
year 
 
47.5 (95) 
Financial surplus to save 
and invest 
 
9.5 (19) 
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Appendix 2: Randomization controls: Distribution of observa-
ble factors over treated groups 
 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 All groups Sign F value 
Age (four categories) 3.04 3.00 2.94 3.06 3.01 0.88 
Sex (two categories) 1.20 1.26 1.20 1.24 1.22 0.84 
Religion (four categories) 1.42 1.48 1.63 1.54 1.52 0.32 
Marital status (three categories) 1.86 1.78 1.75 1.78 1.79 0.85 
Fishing income (four categories) 2.59 2.50 2.57 2.60 2.57 0.92 
Comment: Age has four categories (“Under 18,” “18–24,” “25–50,” “50 and above”). Sex has two categories (“Male”, 
“Female”). Religion has four categories (“Christian,” “Muslim,” “None,” “Other”). Marital status has three categories (“Sin-
gle,” “Married,” “Divorced/Widowed”). Fishing income denotes, “What best describes [a participant’s] income that [he/she] 
gets from fishing” and has four categories (“Subsistence for some months,” “Subsistence for more than six months,” “Subsistence 
for the whole year,” “Financial surplus to save and invest”). 
 
